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Comments on Samansky, "Tax Policy and the
Obligation to Support Children"
ANNE L. ALSTO'r*
Allan Samansky has written a thorough and thoughtful paper on a difficult
subject.1 Part I of this brief commentary addresses several issues Samansky's
paper raises and suggests possible extensions and clarifications. Part H quickly
sketches current legislative developments relating to the taxation of families
with children, which are outside the scope of Samansky's paper but which are
relevant to the broader themes of this conference.
I. TAXATION AND THE OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT CHILDREN
I would like to comment on several issues Samansky's paper raises. In each
case, my comments are primarily intended to extend or clarify, rather than take
issue with, Samansky's analysis.
A. Norms
Samansky's analysis demonstrates that the question of adjusting tax liability
for family size raises some fundamental questions about social attitudes toward
children. Samansky concludes that policy prescriptions must strike a pragmatic
balance among the multiple, overlapping, and sometimes conflicting goals of
tax policy toward children. 2 Although Samansky's analysis does a good job of
illustrating the competing policy goals at stake, it would be useful for the paper
to clarify further the norms underlying both Samansky's conclusions and the
policy proposals he discusses. I will consider two examples.
1. The "Arbitrariness" of Current Law
Samansky initially argues that current law creates "anomalous" results in
the distribution of tax benefits for children. 3 Samansky produces tables that
show the combined effects on tax liability of personal exemptions, the standard
* Associate Professor, Columbia University School of Law.
1 Allan J. Samansky, Tax Poicy and the Obligation to Support Cadren, 57 OHIO ST.
LU. 329 (1996).
2 d. at 380 (concluding that "there is no theoretical approach that should be
systematically used for all taxpayers in determining the effect of children on appropriate tax
liability").
3 d. at 329.
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deduction, the earned income tax credit ("EITC"), and head-of-household filing
status. Samansky's analysis is interesting, because it shows the combined
effects of several provisions. 4 The analysis could, however, benefit from more
careful specification of the norms underlying both Samansky's analysis and the
rules of current law.
Samansky's tables show that a first or second child may yield quite
different tax benefits, both in absolute terms and relative to taxes paid,
depending upon income level. For example, Table M (single parents) shows
that the tax system provides "paltry benefits for those with adjusted gross
incomes of $25,000 and $30,000 compared to those with higher and lower
incomes" and "substantial tax savings" for high-income heads of households. 5
The implicit norm in Samansky's analysis seems to be that tax rules should
provide a tax benefit of equal dollar value per child at every income level. This
norm should be clarified and defended. 6
If one accepts the equal-tax-benefit-per-child norm, then Samansky is quite
right that the pattern of tax benefits is indeed arbitrary. It seems likely,
however, that this seeming arbitrariness is the outcome of policymakers'
attempts to meet other goals and, perhaps, to reconcile a variety of policy
goals. Further, although Samansky is right in noting that legislators seldom
justify the dollar amounts and other precise parameters of their policies, it also
seems likely that those items necessarily have a certain arbitrary quality. No
natural law dictates the precise monetary value of tax benefits, and, particularly
in today's budget-conscious climate, policymakers may make choices
constrained by budget or distributional goals.7
In the latter part of the paper, Samansky reaches a similar conclusion,
noting that at least some of these seemingly anomalous patterns are the result of
4 Cmnpare lane G. Gravelle, Federal Income Tax Treatment of the Family (CRS
Report for Congress), reprinted in 91 TNT 202-28 (Sept. 30, 1991) (analyzing prior tax
law and concluding that "the tax system is reasonably neutral toward families of different
sizes .... A major exception is at very low income levels where large families with the
same ability to pay and families without children are treated more harshly than smaller
families with children.").
5 Samansky, supra note 1, at 342.
6 Compare Gravelle, supra note 4 (comparing effective tax rates for families of
different sizes but the same ability to pay). Gravelle's approach, which compares families of
different sizes but similar ability to pay, assumes the answer to the question Samansky is
most interested in-whether tax liability should be adjusted for family size at all. Gravelle's
tables use the poverty line as the benchmark for comparing the ability to pay of families of
different sizes.
7 See generally Michael j. Graetz, Paint-By-Numbers Tax LaKnaking, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 609, 667-68 (1995) (describing rumors that the 1990 legislation reduced the family-
size adjustment in the EITC to produce more favorable distribution tables).
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policies that attempt to accommodate competing policy goals. For example,
Samansky initially says that the legislative history provides no rationale for the
phaseout of personal exemptions at higher income levels,8 but he later argues
that a "vanishing" or income-tested personal exemption is appropriate because
the affluent do not need the tax benefit as much as poorer families do.9 One
might also note other policy goals that the drafters of the 1990 legislation
surely had in mind: income-testing the exemption raises revenue and increases
the progressivity of a given tax package, at least as measured by Congressional
distribution tables. Samansky also notes, quite rightly, that the phaseout itself
must balance competing policy goals: it targets benefits to lower-income and
middle-income families and achieves budgetary savings (thus keeping overall
tax rates lower or avoiding budget cuts elsewhere), but does so at the cost of
increasing marginal tax rates on upper-income taxpayers, who may reduce
work effort (although this latter point is somewhat more contested than
Samansky indicates). 10
Samansky's analysis might usefully pursue this theme of competing policy
goals still further. For example, he argues that "Congress has not provided any
rationale for the [EITC] percentage amounts or other quantities that it has
chosen for taxpayers with or without children" or for limiting the family-size
adjustment in the EITC to two children.II He notes that a second child for an
E1TC recipient generates a small incremental benefit at low income levels but
that at higher income levels the second child- generates a large benefit, both in
absolute terms and as a percentage of the total EITC benefit.12
Sanansky should extend this analysis to pursue what the appropriate EITC
family-size adjustment should look like, and to consider the competing goals
that may constrain the design of a family-size adjustment in the EITC. For
example, as Samansky notes, the EITC is "in part, a wage or earned-income
supplement for low income persons and, in part, a welfare-type transfer
program in which the payment varies with the number of children." 13 The
earnings subsidy and welfare features of the EITC are clearly in tension with
each other. For example, EITC benefits for the lowest-income workers are
equal to a percentage of earnings (currently, 34% for workers with one child
8 Samansky, supra note 1, at 332.
9/ d at 345-47.
10Id. at, 362-63.
1114 at 338.
12 a (arguing that "the minimal benefit for very low income parents resulting from
the second child is hard to explain" and noting that a first child creates an incremental
benefit of $1793 fbr a parent with $6000 of earnings, but that a second child creates an
additional benefit of only $120).
13 1& at 336.
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and 36% for workers with two or more children). 14 Thus, an ErTC-eligible
worker with earnings of $3,000 receives only half the E1TC benefit that a
worker with earnings of $6,000 does, even though the lower earner is
presumably worse off. No "rational" welfare program would operate this way,
but the EITC does so because it is also an earnings subsidy.15
The linkage between the family size adjustment and the earnings subsidy
feature of the E1TC makes it impossible to meet Samansky's goal of equal per-
child benefits at every income level. Take again the example of two workers,
one earning $3,000 and the other earning $6,000. At $3,000 of earnings, a
second child increases the ErIC benefit by only $60; at $6,000 of earnings, a
second child increases the E1TC benefit by $120.16 At either level of earnings,
a third child provides a benefit of zero. Is this a "rational" pattern? Certainly
not for a welfare program, 17 but on the other hand a pure earnings subsidy
might have no family size adjustment at all.
Samansky's analysis should consider further the uneasy integration of
welfare and earnings-subsidy concepts in the EITC. Samansky proposes
adjusting the E1TC for children after the second child and increasing the small
second-child benefit.18 The proposal would be more convincing if it showed,
or at least considered, the effects of such proposals on the performance of the
EITC as an earnings subsidy, and some approximation of the likely revenue
and distributional effects of such a change. There are a number of alternative
structures for the EITC family size adjustment, and all raise a number of
issues. By analogy to welfare, for example, the EITC might increase by a fixed
dollar amount (e.g., $500) per child, regardless of earnings. Any unconditional
transfer appears, however, to be at odds with the EITC's "work incentive"
function. Jane Gravelle advocates another approach, arguing that the earnings-
subsidy percentage should be constant, but the amount of earnings eligible for
the credit should rise with family size) 9 That approach would award larger
credits to larger families only to the extent that larger families earn more; a
family with income fixed at $x would not receive a larger EITC upon the birth
of an additional child. Finally, a paper on family size adjustments ought to take
some notice of the currently popular "family cap" proposals, which expressly
14 
.R.C. § 32(bXl)(B) (1994).
15 At higher levels of earnings, the E1TC operates more like a welfare program,
reducing benefits as earnings rise. See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and
the Linitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. Rnv. 533, 540-44 (1995).
16 At $3,000 of earnings, the E1TC is $1,020 for one child and $1,080 for two
children. At $6,000 of earnings, the EITC is $2,040 for one child and $2,160 for two
children.17 See infra note 28 (family cap proposals).
18 SaMansky, supra note 1, at 378-80.
19 Gravelle, supra note 4.
Vol. 57:381
COMMEN7S ON SAMANSKY
deny any additional benefits to welfare recipients for an additional child born
while on welfare.
2. Norms and Proposals for Change
Samansky's paper provides a useful summary and analysis of several
prominent approaches to adjusting tax liability for family size. Samansky
addresses each proposal in turn, noting arguments for and against and reaching
his own considered conclusions. Once again, however, the analysis could be
sharpened by further clarification of the underlying norms, which would
highlight the similarities and differences among proposals and demarcate more
clearly the normative basis for Samansky's own proposals.
For example, Lawrence Zelenak distinguishes between the norm of proper
income measurement (which he calls a "tax-internal" goal) and other social
policy ("tax-external") goals.20 Traditionally, many tax policy scholars have
argued that income should be a rough proxy for economic well-being, or
"ability to pay." The idea that income tax burdens should be distributed based
on economic well-being incorporates a significant social-policy judgment,
although it has long been uncontroversial for many tax analysts and so is often
used almost as a technical shorthand. The norm of defining income (as a proxy
for well-being) as accurately as possible is not the only norm that underlies
proposals for the taxation of families with children, however. For example,
Zelenak notes that some proposals for tax benefits for children rely on the
argument that "families with children are worthy of a federal subsidy because
of the positive externalities of well-cared-for-children and the negative
externalities of poorly-cared-for ones." 21
Samansky uses this taxonomy several times; he notes, for example, that
tax-credit proposals typically are justified as a subsidy for child-rearing rather
than as an adjustment to "ability to pay." 22 A more explicit use of these
normative distinctions would be helpful, however. For example, the first three
proposals Samansky considers are motivated by the income-measurement
norm, and the choice among them turns on issues of interpreting the demands
of that norm. For analysts concerned with income-as-well-being, the key
question is whether larger families are worse off than smaller families with the
same income (before any adjustment). Some scholars frame this problem in
terms of consumption. 23 The traditional Haig-Simons definition of income,
20 Lawrence Zelenak, Odidren and the Income Tax, 49 TAxL. REv. 349, 357 (1994).
21 Rd at 357. Or, for example, proposals might be motivated by a view on population
policy. Rd at 357-58.
22 Samansky, supra note 1, at 361.
23 For example, suppose I earn $100 this year. I spend $30 on expenses related to my
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roughly paraphrased, includes annual personal consumption expenditures plus
accretions to wealth. Thus, devotees of Haig-Simons debate whether
expenditures on children are personal consumption, which is taxable, or are
instead "something else" which should not be part of the tax base.
These debates are evident in Samansky's discussions of subsistence-cost
exemptions for children, actual-cost exemptions for children, and income-
splitting. Advocates of exemptions typically argue that subsistence costs (or
actual costs) are not "consumption" and so should be excluded from the tax
base entirely. 24 The result is a family-size adjustment that distinguishes families
with children from families without children at every income level.25
Advocates of income-splitting accept the same income norm but argue that
expenditures on children clearly are consumption. They propose that the
consumption be taxed to the children, however, because the children are the
consumers. As Samansky notes, a third possible position is that these
expenditures are actually parents' consumption.
Thus, the main area of disagreement between advocates of exemptions and
advocates of income-splitting is the proper definition of "well-being" or
"consumption." The basic conflict here seems to be whether "income" in the
sense of "well-being" ought to be broad enough to encompass intangible
benefits, like the psychic benefits of having children, or whether it should
instead be focused on financial need. The basic problem is that the
"consumption" question is too narrow; the question can't be whether children
are "consumption," but instead whether the underlying notion of well-being
should be broad enough to encompass the kind of well-being children confer.
Samansky's analysis struggles with some of these ambiguities.26
One basic problem with the debate, framed in this way, is that it seems
incapable of resolution, at least without further insight into the normative issues
at stake. Competing intuitions about the nature of "consumption" cannot
advance the argument very far and can seem formalistic and divorced from real
social policy concerns. Here, it becomes clear that Zelenak's two sets of norms
work (for example, attending legal conferences, or buying office supplies); I also spend $30
on housing, $20 on food, $10 on recreation, and I save the remaining $10. Under the Haig-
Simons definition, my income is $70, not $100. The sum of my personal consumption is
$60 (housing, food, recreation), and the addition to my net worth is the $10 1 save. The $30
spent on work-related items is neither personal consumption nor an accretion to my net
worth; in tax terminology, it is a cost of earning income, which is deductible.
24 For an excellent analysis of the consumption debates, see Zelenak, supra note 20, at
359-61.
25 I at 361-65 (arguing for a personal exemption at every income level on the
ground that that there is no ability to pay on a subsistence-level income).
26 Samansky, supra note 1, at 371-74 (considering the effect of children on affluent
parents' consumption).
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cannot be understood as entirely distinct from each other. The definition of
income is not a matter of logical deduction, but instead is a socially-constructed
idea that must serve some social purpose. This point is obvious enough, but it
can be lost in debates that seek to fit "children" into rather narrow definitional
categories like "consumption."
In addressing these normative issues, Samansky might consider the
analogous decision by poverty statisticians and designers of welfare programs
to treat larger families as poorer than smaller ones with the same money
incomes.27 Although, as Samansky's review of the literature indicates, there is
considerable controversy about exactly how to adjust income requirements for
family size, there is a fair degree of consensus on the basic point that children
increase economic need.28 Poverty statistics are intended to measure financial
hardship, and welfare benefits are intended to alleviate it, and that goal may
motivate the decision to ignore the psychic benefits of having children. The
right question is whether tax policy, which deals not only with the poor but
also with more affluent families, should adopt a different approach.
At one point in the paper, Samansky suggests that income-measurement is
different at upper-income than at lower-income levels, but here I suspect that he
may be importing a different norm into the analysis. In arguing that income
need not be adjusted for family size at upper-income levels, Samansky argues
that "subsistence" concepts are irrelevant to upper-income families and do not
affect their ability to pay.29 Samansky also argues that children are more
analogous to consumption in higher-income than in lower-income families. 30
Because affluent families have more disposable income, children are more
likely to substitute for conspicuous consumption (Samansky offers the example
of a custom-made suit) than for basic subsistence needs (Samansky's example is
a needed car repair). 31
27 Although "family cap* proposals change that result by denying welfare benefits for
additional children born while the mother is on welfare, the advocates of such proposals
justify them as a departure from usual principles of need in order to punish "unacceptable"
behavior or to change incentives. Samanslky considers poverty thresholds, but only in the
context of measuring children's subsistence needs; my point is that the statistics incorporate
a normative choice not to consider children as providing "consumption" to their parents,
and the interesting question is why tax should take a different approach.
28 The same issues, in theory, arise in poverty measurement and welfare policy-one
might argue that children increase their families' well-being and so it is erroneous to
presume that larger families are worse off than smaller ones. It is worth considering why
this would be a laughable statement in that context but is a seriously debated proposition in
taxation.
29 Samansky, supra note 1, at 345-47.
30,U. at 371-74.
31,U at372.
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This argument is appealing, but not, I think, on the grounds of proper
income measurement, at least as usually stated. The income tax, after all, treats
both a car repair and a custom-made suit as consumption, and includes as
income the money used to buy either. Samansky seems to be arguing here for
the (arguably) separate proposition that poorer people are more deserving of
social assistance than richer people. One might argue that the norm of accurate
income measurement cannot be coherently separated from distributional goals
of the income tax, but the conventional taxonomy Samansky seems to adopt
does treat them separately, so that any contrary argument should be made
explicitly. Samansky's paper might consider in more detail Zelenak's response
to Richard Goode, who also advocates a vanishing exemption on the grounds
that the ability to pay of the affluent is unaffected by subsistence costs. 32
II. CURRENT CoNTRovERSm S: CHILD TAX CREDrrs AND THE EITC
Current legislative proposals would change significantly the taxation of
families with children. 33 The overall effect of these proposals is to increase tax
benefits for better-off families and reduce tax benefits for poorer ones.34
A. Child Tax Credit
The House of Representatives and the Senate Finance Committee have
approved new tax credits for children that would essentially pay $500 per child
to eligible families. Because the credits are not refundable, they would provide
no benefit to low-income families who owe no tax and thus have no tax liability
to offset. The credits are income-tested; the principal difference between the
3 2 Zelenak, supra note 20, at 367-69.
33 The discussion contained in this section is current as of October, 1995. Since
Samansky's paper was submitted to the conference in October, 1995, there has been a
fair amount of legislative action. The House and Senate agreed on a conference bill
containing the changes discussed below with some modifications. See H.R. 2491,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The President, however, vetoed the bill. See Message
Returning Without Approval to the House of Representatives Budget Reconciliation
Legislation, 31 WEEKLY Cown. PPM. Doc. 2140 (Dec. 6, 1995). As a result, the
ultimate fate of these legislative proposals has yet to be determined.3 4 In a recent study, the Treasury Department notes that the Senate tax plan, which
includes both the new child tax credit described below and EITC cuts, would increase taxes
for families with incomes of up to $30,000 per year. Almost half of the benefits of the
package would go to families earning $100,000 or more. Senate Finance Tax Plan Tdts
Benefia Towards Upper-Income Fanfilies, reprinted in 95 TNT 205-15 (Oct. 20, 1995).
This analysis counts cuts in the EITC as a "tax increase" and does not incorporate changes
in AFDC.
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House and Senate alternatives is that the House proposal would begin to phase
out credits at family incomes of $200,000, while the Senate proposal would
begin phaseout at incomes of $110,000 for married couples and $75,000 for
single parents.35 Both proposals cost more than $20 billion annually, and both
provide benefits primarily to middle- and upper-income families.36
Critics of the proposals argue that these expensive tax cuts for affluent
families with children are, in effect, being financed by contemporaneous cuts in
welfare programs for poor families with children.37 Advocates of the child tax
credits respond that "[tihis tax cut is for taxpayers." 38
B. EITC
Both the House and Senate are considering cuts in the EITC. The House
bill would cut the EITC by about $24 billion over seven years; 39 the Senate bill
would makes cuts of $42 billion over the same period.40 The two bills would
both repeal some measures taken to expand the EriC in 1993. For example,
the Senate bill would reduce the size of the EITC available to families with
children, and both bills would repeal the small EITC granted to workers
without children to offset the Social Security payroll tax. In addition, both bills
would restrict ETC eligibility by including more items of income in the
3 5 The Senate child tax credit proposal is included in the reconciliation bill, which is
reprinted in 95 TNT 206-2 (Oct. 23, 1995). The House child tax credit proposal was passed
earlier this year as part of the "Contract With America Tax Act," H.R. 1215, which is
reprinted in 95 TNT 50-3 (March 14, 1995).
36 The House credit would cost about $23 billion per year, and the Senate credit would
cost about $22 billion per year. Revenue estimates for the House bill are reprinted in 95
TNT 84-65 (May 1, 1995); revenue estimates for the Senate bill are reprinted in 95 TNT
202-12 (Oct. 17, 1995).3 7 The House and Senate have both passed bills that would end the entitlement status of
AFDC, convert AFDC and other programs into block grants, and reduce funding from
projected levels. See Robert Pear, Senate Welfare Plan Cuts $41 Billion Over Seven Years,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 26, 1995, at A18; Robert Pear, House Backs Bill Undoing Decades of
Welfare Policy, N.Y. TIMES, March 25, 1995, at Al (describing proposed cuts in welfare
programs).
38 See Fred Stokeld, Gran Dfends GOP Tax Cuts, 95 TNT 205_6 (Oct. 20, 1995)
(quoting Senator Gramm).39 Joint Committee on Taxation, Erzimnated Budget Effects of Reconciliation Provisions
As Approved by the Committee on Ways and Means, reprinted in 95 TNT 188-34 (Sept. 26,
1995).
40 For descriptions of House and Senate committee action, see Robert D. Hershey, Jr.,
Panel Cuts Tax Credit Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1995, at B8; Fred Stokeld, Finance
Approves Major Scaleback of ElTC, 95 TNT 192-1 (Oct. 2, 1995).
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income base that determines phaseout of the credit.41 The Treasury Department
estimates that the Senate Finance Committee cuts would result in an average tax
increase of $352 for 17 million low-income working families. 42
Current proposals to cut the EITC are puzzling because the EITC had
strong bipartisan support until very recently. 43 In 1993, legislators of both
parties approved a significant expansion of the program, following a large
increase in 1990. The EITC seemed to occupy an ideal political position: it
allowed legislators to give money to the "deserving" (working) poor and to
claim that the program would encourage welfare recipients to work. 44 What
explains the sudden change? Much of the substantive debate has focused on
whether the EITC is an effective work incentive and whether the program is
rife with fraud. These arguments, however, are both overstated and familiar;
there is no new substantive development that would explain the EITC's sudden
reversal of fortune.
The best empirical evidence suggests that the EiTC probably has a small
positive or negative effect on total hours of work by EITC recipients but does
induce some nonworkers to go to work and is mildly successful in increasing
work hours by the lowest-paid workers. 45 The EITC may reduce work hours
slightly for some higher-earning workers, although it is difficult to object if
these workers, who are already more strongly attached to the labor force, take
a little extra time off from work to spend with their families. 46
Recent claims about EITC fraud are also overstated. Although a 1994 IRS
study found errors that would disallow 26% of ETC benefits claimed, that
figure probably overstates current EITC compliance problems. The IRS would
have detected and disallowed some of those claims, and the study examined
electronically-filed returns, which typically are unusually likely to contain
errors. The IRS study also suggests that half the errors were mistakes, not
fraud, and there is some early evidence that recent improvements in IRS
compliance efforts seem to be working. Although the EITC does face some
4 1 The Senate bill is reprinted in 95 TNT 206-12 (Oct. 23, 1995); the House bill is
reprinted in 95 TNT 189-13 (Sept. 27, 1995).4 2 Repeal of the tax credit for childless workers results in an average tax increase of
$173 for about 4 million workers with incomes below $9,500. The reduction in the EITC is
offset for some, but not all, families by the $500 per child tax credit.
4 3 See, e.g., Sara Rimer, Cuting Tax Credit Means Much to Those nith Little, N.Y.
TmEs, Oct. 16, 1995, at Al. Reagan called the E1TC "the best antipoverty, the best pro-
family, the best job creation measure to come out of Congress."
44 See Alstott, supra note 15, at 537-39.
45 See, e.g., Jane G. Gravelle, The Earned Income Tax Credit: Effects on Work Effort
(CRS Report for Congress), reprinted in 95 TNT 181-39 (Sept. 15, 1995) (summarizing
studies of the E1TC's effect on labor supply).
46 See Alstott, supra note 15, at 556.
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inevitable administrative limitations, these are a tradeoff for other
administrative benefits. 47
These characteristics of the EITC are not news. Well before 1993, policy
analysts had pointed out that the EITC is somewhat prone to noncompliance
and may discourage work effort by some recipients. 48 The change is more
likely a product of the current, desperate search for revenue to fund tax cuts,
and the ideological shift in Congress brought about by the 1994 election.
Thanks to the 1990 and 1993 legislation, the E1TC grew to be a major transfer
program; the annual cost of the EITC now exceeds by a large amount federal
expenditures on AFDC.49 The EITC is, thus, a much larger and potentially
lucrative budget target than ever before.50 In addition, in recent years,
conservative journalists have begun attacking the EITC with increasing fervor
as a "fraud-riddled giveaway that makes AFDC seem positively civilized." 51
As hostility to income-tested redistributive programs has reached a new high,
this time the EITC has been lumped with "welfare" instead of with "work." 52
47 For a discussion of these tradeoffi, see id. at 564-89.
48 See, e.g., the sources cited in id. at nn. 58 & 211.
4 9 See, e.g., HoUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 103D CONG., 2D SESS., OVERVIEW
oFENTrmnEMENT PRoGRAwS: 1994 GREENBooK 389 (Comm. Print 1994) [hereinafter 1994
GREEN BooK] (estimating that federal expenditures on benefits and administrative costs
under AFDC are $14.3 billion in 1995); id., at 678 (estimating that total expenditures on the
EITC in 1995 are $21.1 billion).
50 A Republican press release points out that "the E1TC will cost over $193 billion
over the next seven years and will continue to be one of the faste growing government
transfer programs." Senate Budget Comittee Bulletin Responds to ritics of EITC Plans,
95 TNT 104-62 (May 30, 1995).5 1 Lisa Schiffren, America's Best-Kept Welfare Secret, THE AM. SPECrATOR 24 (April
1995).
52 See, e.g., Stokeld, supra note 38 (quoting Senator Gramm as saying that the EITC
is "basically a welfare rather than a tax program"); John Godfrey, Republicans Defend
Finance Camduee'sProposed EITC Cuts, 95 TNT 187-1 (Sept. 25, 1995) (quoting Senator
Don Nickles as describing the EITC as the "fastest-growing, most fraudulent welfare
program").
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